Climate change requires an energy technology revolution, Chu says

Secretary of Energy Steven Chu discussed the need for an aggressive national energy policy at a packed John F. Kennedy Jr. Forum event, “Laying the Foundation for the Next Generation of Clean Energy Jobs,” on August 6, 2009. He outlined challenges of global warming and potential strategies that could provide solutions.

“We are changing the destiny of the earth,” Chu said, “but we have the opportunity to minimize that change.”

The looming threat of irreversible climate change requires a bold “new industrial revolution” sparked by innovation, regulation, and investment, according to Chu and U.S Rep. Edward Markey (D-Malden), who also spoke at the Forum, which was sponsored by the Belfer Center along with the Institute of Politics. Chu and Markey said they believe that revolution is on the horizon with the new administration and proposed legislation.

Markey, co-sponsor of the American Clean Energy and Security Act, commonly referred to as the Waxman-Markey bill, sees the bill, which passed the House earlier this summer, as the third piece to a trio of bills – alongside the 2007 energy act and 2009 stimulus bill. He compared its effect in spurring the creation of new energy technologies to earlier legislative efforts that energized the telecommunications revolution.

“Here, because energy is a four times larger sector than telecomm, we believe it will unleash $1 trillion to $2 trillion, minimum, of private sector investment and we’re already beginning to see the early stages of that in our country,” said Markey, who gave a special introduction to Chu.

While both recognize that this bill has some flaws, they said it is important to begin taking action on energy as soon as possible. “The issue is, quite frankly, you want as strong a bill as possible, but you want a bill,” Chu said. “The real issue is getting going.”

Chu and Markey said the United States needs to advance renewables, such as wind and solar, but also find ways to clean up current forms of energy, such as coal.

“The United States, China, India, and even Russia will not turn their backs on coal because that’s where two-thirds of the coal supplies lie,” Chu said. “We have to figure out how to use it in a clean way and an economically viable way.

“The United States has an opportunity to invent those technologies that can enable us to use this resource,” he said.

Markey noted that the Waxman-Markey bill also places the U.S. in a better position to negotiate a new international climate agreement at Copenhagen next year. He said that when he met with China’s President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao earlier this year to discuss the bill, they understood this was game-changing legislation.

“We are no longer preaching temperance from a bar stool,” Markey said.

Chu highlighted a new McKinsey report that showed enormous savings from energy efficiency. “This is not something that has sunk in to the American public,” Chu said. “When you think of energy efficiency, the vast majority of people think, ‘Oh that costs more money. Can I afford it?’ How can you afford not to do this?”

Better technology will lead to lower costs and smaller bills, he said, citing the refrigerator as an example. Between 1970 and today, the refrigerator decreased in cost and the amount of energy used as a result of new technology.

Chu envisions American innovation that will not only create the technology and jobs for where we are today, but where we will be. The Waxman-Markey bill will create the technologies and “jobs that prepare America for the future,” he said.

This article was originally published here: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19503/

Intrastate Conflict Program Advises on Governance in Africa

The Belfer Center's Program on Intrastate Conflict and Conflict Resolution (ICP) at Harvard Kennedy School traveled to meet with leaders and officials in Rwanda and Malawi in January to discuss the 2008 Index of African Governance.

ICP Director Robert I. Rotberg and Rachel Gisselquist, research director for the Index of African Governance, first met with government officials in Rwanda. The government of Rwanda initiated and organized a large seminar in Kigali, Rwanda's capital, for officials, NGO leaders, and donors to explore how the Index of African Governance could most effectively be used to strengthen governmental performance and improve everyday life in impoverished Rwanda, according to Rotberg.

The Index of African Governance is an annual report that ranks 48 sub-Saharan African nations on governance according to 57 different variables, from safety and security through rule of law to various health and educational attainments. The Index was first published in 2007, and the 2008 report appears as a web document and in book form under the title Strengthening African Governance.

Rwanda, which ranked eighteenth in the most recent Index, wants to improve its score and better the lives of its inhabitants and attract foreign investment, Rotberg said. The Index is structured so that countries can clearly see areas they might improve.

"In Kigali, the eighty or so Rwandans at the all-day seminar were interested in the Index's many messages for their future. They also pushed back vigorously in cross-examining the Index and its assumptions," Rotberg said.

In Malawi, where ICP Program Manager Katie Naeve and Editorial Associate Emily Wood joined them, Rotberg and Gisselquist met with the Index African Advisory Council over the course of two days. The Council is made up of African academics and practitioners who oversee the Index quality.

Rotberg and Gisselquist also met with parliamentarians in Lilongwe, Malawi's capital, and showed how Malawi, which ranked eleventh, might improve its scores by strengthening governance and reducing poverty.

"We had a very interesting discussion with the Women's Caucus in parliament, which invited us to present the Index results, specifically those related to gender, Gisselquist said. "These women also shared with us their concerns and priorities. We talked a lot about education, health care, and clean water, and about the particular challenges of communities in peri-urban areas. It was a very useful discussion."

This article was originally published here: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18869/

Frazer offers lessons on transformative U.S.-Africa policy

The Bush Administration made a mistake not enforcing a no-fly zone over Sudan in response to the conflict in Darfur, according to Jendayi Frazer, former assistant secretary of state for African affairs, but she hopes President Barack Obama will fulfill the policy he campaigned on and enforce one.

"I think we made a mistake in not trying to put a no-fly zone in place," she said at Harvard Kennedy School's John F. Kennedy Jr. Forum on April 7, 2009. There was concern that a no-fly zone would impede the work of humanitarian organizations in Darfur; however, since Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir expelled most of those organizations, some view the argument as moot.

"I think you can do a no-fly zone. I think it's feasible," Frazer said.

In spite of this policy failure, Frazer saw several U.S. policies put in place toward Africa that she views as being transformational while serving as assistant secretary (2005-2009), senior director for African Affairs at the National Security Council (2001-2004), and ambassador to South Africa (2004-2005). In her address, "Solutions: A Transformative U.S.-Africa Policy," she offered lessons learned - in terms of health, economic development, conflict resolution, and governance - for the new Obama administration as it crafts its policy toward Africa.

The event was cosponsored by Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Institute of Politics, Harvard University African Student Association, and Harvard College Black Student Association. Belfer Center Director Graham Allison, who moderated the event, welcomed Frazer home to Harvard Kennedy School, where she was an assistant professor of public policy and a Belfer Center faculty affiliate.

She emphasized the need for collaboration and active dialogue with the "African leaders on the ground," a philosophy she sees as a cornerstone of the Bush administration's policy.

"In the past there was a tendency to try to work Africa through Europe," Frazer said. "Where as I felt we should just work Africa directly."

Frazer highlighted the "President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief," commonly known as PEPFAR, attributing its success to the fact that it was based on an African model. "We had something that we knew worked - coming from Africa, developed in Africa," she said.

The Plan, launched in 2003, expanded on Uganda's ABC prevention and treatment model: "Abstain, Be faithful, use Condoms." Between fiscal years 2004 to 2008, the U.S. has spent more than $18 billion on this effort. Frazer said the Bush administration's policies were successful in treating HIV/AIDS, but more needs to be done in terms of prevention and suggested that Obama should focus on that.

In terms of economic development, she said the Obama administration has to make sure African leaders are not on the sidelines in the policy-making process, noting diversification of trade and greater foreign investment as crucial aspects of a comprehensive development policy.

Frazer attributes the Bush administration's success in attaining resolutions to the six major African wars happening in 2001 to the role of African mediators in the peace processes. She said that for every crisis, the Bush administration worked with African mediators and the sub-regional organizations and trained African peacekeepers. She also noted the increase in and continued need for better governance by African leaders as a means of responding to crises.

Frazer also sees the establishment of institutions and the historic level of funding as key parts of the Bush administration policy's transformational legacy.

To watch Jendayi Frazer's address, go to: http://www.iop.harvard.edu/Multimedia-Center/All-Videos/Solutions-A-Transformative-U.S.-African-Policy

This article was originally published here: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18962/

Demographic Projections Predict Fundamentalist Populations Surpassing Secular Counterparts

According to demographic projections, Jewish, Muslim, and Christian fundamentalists will gain significant ground against their liberal and secular counterparts by 2050, even surpassing them in some cases, Belfer Center Fellow Eric Kaufmann said at last week's International Security Program (ISP) brownbag presentation.

Kaufmann, a joint fellow with ISP and the Initiative on Religion in International Affairs, outlined fertility trends within religious groups and the impact this may have on regional, national, and global politics and security in his talk, "Religious Fundamentalism as the End of History? The Political Demography of the Abrahamic Faiths."

The increase in the size of a religion's fundamentalist population can change the local and even national politics of a country. During the twentieth century, conservative Protestants increased from little more than a third of the white Protestant total (among those born in 1900) to almost two-thirds (for those born after 1975). Only a quarter of this effect was down to changes in switching patterns, the rest accruing to demography. Indeed, one graph showed the relationship between a state’s non-Hispanic White total fertility rate (TFR) in 2002 and the percent vote for George Bush in 2004. At one end of the spectrum was Utah, which had the highest TFR and percentage of people who voted for Bush, and on the other end was Massachusetts and Rhode Island.

Demographic change can threaten a state's security because it produces a larger pool of potential religious militants. Kaufmann pointed out that while most fundamentalists are not militant, all militants are fundamentalists.

Kaufmann hypothesizes that while the Fukuyama, "post-historical" core societies — liberal democratic, capitalist and secular — have been able to survive external threats like the advancement of technology and the challenge of socialism, it may not be a demographically sustainable system. There is the possibility that the stark differences in growth rate between religious fundamentalists and others could threaten this system from within.

The population "will become increasingly religious and conservative in the long-term, reversing decades — even centuries — of liberal secularization. There will be no mass conversions or sudden shifts in the cultural mood. Instead, religiosity will spread largely through demographic advantage in a world where secular religions and sources of enchantment have exhausted themselves," Kaufmann said.

The first demographic transition, which lasted between the 18–20th centuries, resulted in a population boom because the total fertility rate (TFR) was higher than the death rate. Today, it appears that the world is on the verge of a second demographic transition, where there are fewer births than deaths. The current world total fertility rate (TFR) is 2.55, but the U.N. predicts that it will drop to 2.33, below the replacement rate, during 2020–2050.

While the overall TFR is on the decline, the TFR among those on the more religious end of the spectrum remains well above replacement. American Jews have a very low TFR of 1.43, but within this group, ultra-Orthodox Jews (Haredim) stand out as exceptionally fertile: they increased their share of American Jewry from 7.2 to 9.4 percent during 2000–2006 alone. In Israel, the Haredim had a TFR of 7.61 in 1996 while other Israeli Jews' TFR stood at just 2.27. This will enable the Haredi to form a majority soon after 2050. Kaufmann hypothetically asked lecture attendees to consider the impact this could have on the peace process since the orthodox and Haredim are particularly attached to Jerusalem — where they are a majority — and to the holy places and "promised" land of the West Bank.

While demographic change will transform Judaism the fastest, both Christianity and Islam show similar patterns. Within Islam, conservative politicians like Ahmadinedjad of Iran or the Taliban in Afghanistan urge larger families and denounce birth control. Muslim governments have endorsed family planning, but at the mass level, supporters of political Islamist doctrines like sharia are significantly more fertile than other Muslims, an effect that is most pronounced in the growing cities. In urban areas, most people are on an equal footing when it comes to accessing family planning and incentives to keep families small, so values, be they secular or Islamist, play a big role in determining family size.

In reply to a question, Kaufmann speculated that demography may expose a contradiction, first cited by Nietzsche, between liberalism's practical need to defend itself and its inability to legitimate the illiberal policies that may be required to do so.

This article was originally published here: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18824/

There is hope, and a lot of work needed, for peace after Gaza

Israelis and Palestinians must reconcile their differences from within before they can have productive talks with each other about moving toward a peace agreement, according to two Middle East experts at Wednesday’s [February 11] John F. Kennedy Jr. Forum, “The Road to Peace After Gaza.”

Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns, Harvard Kennedy School professor of the practice of diplomacy and international politics and member of the Belfer Center’s board of directors, moderated the conversation between Shai Feldman, director of Brandeis University’s Crown Center for Middle East Studies and member of the Belfer Center’s board of directors, and Rashid Khalidi, Edward Said professor of Arab Studies at Columbia University.

Despite the two groups’ history of violence, distrust, and failed peace talks, Khalidi and Feldman agreed that there is the possibility of peace. Before this can happen, however, they both said that there are steps Israel and the Palestinian Authority must take in terms of how they interact with their own internal factions and each other.

“I think in order to actually have progress towards any Palestinian goals, obviously you have to resolve this terrible split in Palestinian politics,” Khalidi said. “The Palestinians have to have a national consensus if they’re going to come to the table.”

Feldman said he believes Israel’s major challenge is overcoming the schizophrenic nature of the Israeli electorate. Despite a majority of Israelis supporting an end to the conflict through a two-state solution, they are pessimistic and unsure of how to actually live with the preferred solution. Israel’s election, which was too close to call at the time of the Forum, underscored this split.

“One of the negative offsprings of what has happened as a result of these rockets that have reached longer and longer ranges,” Feldman said, “is that now Israelis are becoming even more hyper-sensitive to some of these security issues.” Whatever is negotiated, he said, “Israelis are going to be even more insistent on the security dimension of these negotiations.”

Khalidi countered that, while security is a necessary aspect of the peace process, the use of force has not and will not work. “There is an illusion that this is a problem that can only be solved by force,” he said. “The illusion is fostered by demonizing the other side. Palestinians demonize the Israelis, but heaven knows Hamas, particularly, has been demonized.”

Along with bringing all Israeli and Palestinian factions to the table, Burns questioned who else should be part of the discussion. Both Feldman and Khalidi referenced the 1991 Madrid talks, where then-Secretary of State James Baker brought together delegations from Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinians – the first time all these groups were gathered face-to-face – to discuss a peace process and normalization of relations in the region with Israel. They agree that a similar multilateral framework – including the 1991 countries, plus Iran – will be needed for peace today.

While Khalidi focused more on the need to have all parties, specifically Hamas and Iran, present, Feldman expressed more concern with the purpose of the engagement. “‘Would you engage Hamas?’ or ‘would you engage Iran?’ is not the essential question. The real question is: what are you going to engage them about? What is going to be the nature of the conversation?” Feldman said. “You cannot ignore Hamas. The question is how do you deal with them?”

Despite their differences, Feldman and Khalidi both agreed that the need for a sustainable peace agreement is vital to both sides. The Palestinians “will inevitably and necessarily rebel again, and again, and again because their conditions are intolerable,” Khalidi said.

In the 61 years since the creation of Israel, “The Israeli people have not known a single day of peace,” Burns said, “and the Palestinian people have not had a day of justice.” He added that the Feldman and Khalidi discussion gave him greater hope for peace in the future.

This article was originally published here: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18821/

Memo to the New President: Managing the Iraq War

In this exclusive web video, Meghan L. O'Sullivan, lecturer in public policy at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center and former Special Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan, discusses the challenges in Iraq facing the Obama administration.



TRANSCRIPT

The Status of Forces Agreement concluded in November 2008. What is the significance of this agreement and what does it mean for the future of U.S.-Iraq relations?

The Status of Forces Agreement that was just concluded between Iraq and the United States is an historic agreement and let me describe three reasons why it is so significant. First, at the broadest level, it provides a common vision between Iraq and the United States about what the relationship between these two countries is going to be over the next three years. This common vision and this agreement on how our forces are going to be regulated in Iraq over the next three years and how our forces are going to leave over the next three years; this is a new element to our relationship. The second way in which the agreement is significant is that it gives the United States and its forces what is really needed and that is a legal mandate for the conduct of the forces on the ground in Iraq until the time in which they depart. For the last several years, the United States and the government of Iraq have gone to the U.N. to get this mandate. This has had to be done on an annual basis and the mandate that is given was given under something called a Chapter 7 Status, which called Iraq a threat to international peace and security. Obviously, the Iraqis didn't like that very much and they didn't really like the content of the mandate, which really gave America very broad authorities and immunities. So the Status of Forces Agreement replaces that and offers an alternative legal mandate -- one that lasts three years instead of just one. The last way in which this agreement is very significant is that it really is a manifestation of Iraqi sovereignty. The primacy of Iraqi decision making is clear throughout the document. Two examples: Iraqis will have control over all detainees in Iraqi after a certain period of time; they'll be a transfer beginning at the beginning of the year. And secondly, Iraqis will have control over operations in the sense that no unilateral operations will be able to be done without their approval. So in these three regards, I would say this is a very historic agreement, one that both Iraq and the United States should be proud of.

What is the greatest challenge facing President-elect Barack Obama in Iraq, and will he need to rethink the approach he laid out during his campaign?

One of the greatest challenges facing the Obama administration will be how to divide resources between Iraq and Afghanistan. On the one hand, I think some people look at this and think, "Iraq appears to be stabilizing; it's a good thing. Afghanistan appears to be heading downward and that's a bad thing and we should therefore be transferring resources from Iraq to Afghanistan." I think that's the way things should go and they will go, but it's really a question of timing and this is more an art than a science. What the Obama administration will be faced with is two very different problems. Iraq, on the one hand, is a country that has a history of being very centralized, having a very strong government. It is a very wealthy country; it had a budget and a supplementary budget last year [2007] that totaled $72 billion for a population of about 29 million. In contrast, you have very different challenges in Afghanistan. The population is not as urbanized as it is in Iraq and the population is bigger; the country is bigger. Afghanistan also has less resources at its disposal. In contrast to Iraq's $72 billion budget, Afghanistan's internally generated budget was $680 million only. So you have very, very different, and there's many other things I could describe, but you have very different challenges. And there will be different strategies that are needed. And I think the challenge, as I mentioned, is how to take resources from Iraq and move them to Afghanistan. Because what no one wants is resources moved so quickly that things start to become less stable or shakier or deteriorate in Iraq at the same time that those resources may not be sufficient to change the trajectory in Afghanistan. And I think part of getting this right, part of the art of this, will be taking the right lessons from Iraq and applying them to Afghanistan.

What kind of leverage will President-elect Obama have to push Iraq toward the goals outlined in the Status of Forces Agreement?

Another challenge for the Obama administration will be finding its right relationship with the Iraqi leadership. The Bush administration had a very close relationship with the prime minister and many of Iraq's senior most leaders. No doubt, the Obama administration will also build close and good relationships. But there's the question: what will be the leverage that the United States has with the Iraqis and with this leadership, and how will it be utilized? A lot of people in the foreign policy community have talked about the United States having more conditionality, using a little bit more of an approach where the U.S. would ask Iraq to do certain, specific things in return for ensuring American support. Now this approach, this element of conditionality may be more successful in the future than it was in the past. And there's one main reason for this. In the past, Iraq's state was so fragile that something that was highly conditional, meaning a threat to withdraw forces unless the Iraqi government did x, y, or z, that could be a problem in the sense that if Iraqis didn't have the ability or didn't have the will to take the desired step then the United States would be forced to act on its conditionality or on its threat and that would have potentially fatal consequences for the process of building the Iraqi state and for American interests in the region. Today the Iraqi state is much stronger. The Iraqi institutions are growing in strength. And this element of conditionality may make more sense between Iraq and the United States. Iraqis are better positioned to deliver and they're better positioned to be an equal partner with the United States in setting forth the path ahead.

This was originally published here: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18783/