Demographic Projections Predict Fundamentalist Populations Surpassing Secular Counterparts

According to demographic projections, Jewish, Muslim, and Christian fundamentalists will gain significant ground against their liberal and secular counterparts by 2050, even surpassing them in some cases, Belfer Center Fellow Eric Kaufmann said at last week's International Security Program (ISP) brownbag presentation.

Kaufmann, a joint fellow with ISP and the Initiative on Religion in International Affairs, outlined fertility trends within religious groups and the impact this may have on regional, national, and global politics and security in his talk, "Religious Fundamentalism as the End of History? The Political Demography of the Abrahamic Faiths."

The increase in the size of a religion's fundamentalist population can change the local and even national politics of a country. During the twentieth century, conservative Protestants increased from little more than a third of the white Protestant total (among those born in 1900) to almost two-thirds (for those born after 1975). Only a quarter of this effect was down to changes in switching patterns, the rest accruing to demography. Indeed, one graph showed the relationship between a state’s non-Hispanic White total fertility rate (TFR) in 2002 and the percent vote for George Bush in 2004. At one end of the spectrum was Utah, which had the highest TFR and percentage of people who voted for Bush, and on the other end was Massachusetts and Rhode Island.

Demographic change can threaten a state's security because it produces a larger pool of potential religious militants. Kaufmann pointed out that while most fundamentalists are not militant, all militants are fundamentalists.

Kaufmann hypothesizes that while the Fukuyama, "post-historical" core societies — liberal democratic, capitalist and secular — have been able to survive external threats like the advancement of technology and the challenge of socialism, it may not be a demographically sustainable system. There is the possibility that the stark differences in growth rate between religious fundamentalists and others could threaten this system from within.

The population "will become increasingly religious and conservative in the long-term, reversing decades — even centuries — of liberal secularization. There will be no mass conversions or sudden shifts in the cultural mood. Instead, religiosity will spread largely through demographic advantage in a world where secular religions and sources of enchantment have exhausted themselves," Kaufmann said.

The first demographic transition, which lasted between the 18–20th centuries, resulted in a population boom because the total fertility rate (TFR) was higher than the death rate. Today, it appears that the world is on the verge of a second demographic transition, where there are fewer births than deaths. The current world total fertility rate (TFR) is 2.55, but the U.N. predicts that it will drop to 2.33, below the replacement rate, during 2020–2050.

While the overall TFR is on the decline, the TFR among those on the more religious end of the spectrum remains well above replacement. American Jews have a very low TFR of 1.43, but within this group, ultra-Orthodox Jews (Haredim) stand out as exceptionally fertile: they increased their share of American Jewry from 7.2 to 9.4 percent during 2000–2006 alone. In Israel, the Haredim had a TFR of 7.61 in 1996 while other Israeli Jews' TFR stood at just 2.27. This will enable the Haredi to form a majority soon after 2050. Kaufmann hypothetically asked lecture attendees to consider the impact this could have on the peace process since the orthodox and Haredim are particularly attached to Jerusalem — where they are a majority — and to the holy places and "promised" land of the West Bank.

While demographic change will transform Judaism the fastest, both Christianity and Islam show similar patterns. Within Islam, conservative politicians like Ahmadinedjad of Iran or the Taliban in Afghanistan urge larger families and denounce birth control. Muslim governments have endorsed family planning, but at the mass level, supporters of political Islamist doctrines like sharia are significantly more fertile than other Muslims, an effect that is most pronounced in the growing cities. In urban areas, most people are on an equal footing when it comes to accessing family planning and incentives to keep families small, so values, be they secular or Islamist, play a big role in determining family size.

In reply to a question, Kaufmann speculated that demography may expose a contradiction, first cited by Nietzsche, between liberalism's practical need to defend itself and its inability to legitimate the illiberal policies that may be required to do so.

This article was originally published here: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18824/

There is hope, and a lot of work needed, for peace after Gaza

Israelis and Palestinians must reconcile their differences from within before they can have productive talks with each other about moving toward a peace agreement, according to two Middle East experts at Wednesday’s [February 11] John F. Kennedy Jr. Forum, “The Road to Peace After Gaza.”

Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns, Harvard Kennedy School professor of the practice of diplomacy and international politics and member of the Belfer Center’s board of directors, moderated the conversation between Shai Feldman, director of Brandeis University’s Crown Center for Middle East Studies and member of the Belfer Center’s board of directors, and Rashid Khalidi, Edward Said professor of Arab Studies at Columbia University.

Despite the two groups’ history of violence, distrust, and failed peace talks, Khalidi and Feldman agreed that there is the possibility of peace. Before this can happen, however, they both said that there are steps Israel and the Palestinian Authority must take in terms of how they interact with their own internal factions and each other.

“I think in order to actually have progress towards any Palestinian goals, obviously you have to resolve this terrible split in Palestinian politics,” Khalidi said. “The Palestinians have to have a national consensus if they’re going to come to the table.”

Feldman said he believes Israel’s major challenge is overcoming the schizophrenic nature of the Israeli electorate. Despite a majority of Israelis supporting an end to the conflict through a two-state solution, they are pessimistic and unsure of how to actually live with the preferred solution. Israel’s election, which was too close to call at the time of the Forum, underscored this split.

“One of the negative offsprings of what has happened as a result of these rockets that have reached longer and longer ranges,” Feldman said, “is that now Israelis are becoming even more hyper-sensitive to some of these security issues.” Whatever is negotiated, he said, “Israelis are going to be even more insistent on the security dimension of these negotiations.”

Khalidi countered that, while security is a necessary aspect of the peace process, the use of force has not and will not work. “There is an illusion that this is a problem that can only be solved by force,” he said. “The illusion is fostered by demonizing the other side. Palestinians demonize the Israelis, but heaven knows Hamas, particularly, has been demonized.”

Along with bringing all Israeli and Palestinian factions to the table, Burns questioned who else should be part of the discussion. Both Feldman and Khalidi referenced the 1991 Madrid talks, where then-Secretary of State James Baker brought together delegations from Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinians – the first time all these groups were gathered face-to-face – to discuss a peace process and normalization of relations in the region with Israel. They agree that a similar multilateral framework – including the 1991 countries, plus Iran – will be needed for peace today.

While Khalidi focused more on the need to have all parties, specifically Hamas and Iran, present, Feldman expressed more concern with the purpose of the engagement. “‘Would you engage Hamas?’ or ‘would you engage Iran?’ is not the essential question. The real question is: what are you going to engage them about? What is going to be the nature of the conversation?” Feldman said. “You cannot ignore Hamas. The question is how do you deal with them?”

Despite their differences, Feldman and Khalidi both agreed that the need for a sustainable peace agreement is vital to both sides. The Palestinians “will inevitably and necessarily rebel again, and again, and again because their conditions are intolerable,” Khalidi said.

In the 61 years since the creation of Israel, “The Israeli people have not known a single day of peace,” Burns said, “and the Palestinian people have not had a day of justice.” He added that the Feldman and Khalidi discussion gave him greater hope for peace in the future.

This article was originally published here: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18821/